*Dr. Konstantinos P. Balomenos

The Chinese General Sun Tzu famously stated:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

In this context, the present article aims to analyse Turkish foreign policy in light of current geopolitical developments, with a view to assessing whether what many in Greece describe as Turkey’s “geopolitical upgrade” represents a genuine transformation or merely a propagandistic construct shaped by circumstantial coincidence.

To ensure the reliability and validity of this analysis, primary source material from a key figure in Turkish foreign policy, Hakan Fidan, is employed. Shortly after assuming leadership of Turkey’s foreign policy in 2023, Fidan published an article titled: “Turkish Foreign Policy at the Turn of the ‘Century of Türkiye’: Challenges, Vision, Objectives, and Transformation” [see: Insight Türkiye, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2023)].

In this article, referring to Turkey’s self-image as a regional, creative, and transformative actor, Fidan asserts:

“Türkiye is once again emerging as a force for good, assuming a strengthened role of responsibility on the international stage. It stands out as a problem-solver, a system-improver, and a transformative actor in the region and in global affairs, at the threshold of the ‘Century of Türkiye.’”

According to Fidan, the international order, as envisioned by Turkey, is evolving beyond the traditional paradigm of a system structured around power poles—whether unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. Turkey aspires to contribute to the formation of a more inclusive, effective, just, and secure international order—one capable of responding to contemporary global and regional challenges. This would be a system grounded in solidarity rather than antagonism.

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This is a formidable undertaking—one that requires strategic patience and unwavering resolve. Turkey, with its steadfast political will and growing capabilities, is well positioned to become one of the architects of such a reimagined international system. Its pursuit of a more just, inclusive, and secure global order stems from principles of justice and conscience deeply embedded in the enduring civilisation and identity of the Turkish people—principles consistently reflected in the country’s foreign policy approach.

Turkey stands ready to work with other states in defending shared values and fulfilling common responsibilities in building a global order that prioritises human welfare, addresses economic inequalities, and advances peace, security, stability, and prosperity across the world.

Furthermore, with regard to the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy, the Foreign Minister underscores in the same article the necessity of adopting a holistic and integrated strategy.  Central elements of this approach include: consolidating peace and security in Turkey’s immediate region, institutionalising foreign relations on a structural basis, cultivating an environment of prosperity, and promoting Turkey’s global objectives.

Four primary goals are emphasised:

1. Turkey’s Contribution to Regional Peace and Security and the Creation of New Cooperation Models, aiming both to eliminate threats and address challenges, and to harness opportunities for developing regional economic and political cooperation frameworks.
2. Further Institutionalisation of Foreign Relations through the reinforcement of existing strategic partnerships and the establishment of new ones—such as the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), which promotes the cultural heritage of the Turkic world, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), through which Turkey seeks to enhance cooperation with Muslim countries.
3. Development of a Prosperity-Oriented Environment, with the goal of positioning Turkey among the world’s top 10 economies, thereby expanding its global trade and contributing to the well-being of its citizens and partners.
4. Promotion of Global Objectives by strengthening its presence in various regions and addressing global challenges.

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Assessing these developments, and focusing on Turkey’s ongoing efforts to expand its influence within the international system—by leveraging its geostrategic location, economic and military capabilities, and adopting a more assertive and proactive foreign policy—one can reasonably conclude that the ultimate objective of Turkey’s high strategy is to consolidate its status as a middle power within the broader regional system encompassing the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa.

In international relations, the concept of a middle power refers to states that, while not superpowers, possess sufficient economic, military, or political strength to exert significant influence in both regional and international contexts.

More specifically, middle powers typically pursue multilateral cooperation through engagement in international organizations (e.g., the United Nations, WTO, OSCE), exert diplomatic influence by forming alliances, offering economic assistance, or mediating inter-state conflicts, and seek to foster regional stability by assuming leadership roles during crises in their neighborhood.

From this perspective, Turkey has indeed made notable efforts in recent years to enhance its geopolitical weight and emerge as a significant middle power on the global stage.

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Turkey effectively leverages both tangible and intangible national assets to increase its room for maneuver in the international arena. It can negotiate with, and sometimes resist, the policies of major powers. Yet, recognising its limitations in acting autonomously on a global scale, it seeks influence through regional and international groupings.

In line with the theory of liberal international relations scholars Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (Relocating Middle Powers), Turkey aspires to act as:

• A catalyst—initiating international discussions,
• A facilitator—building partnerships and alliances,
• A manager—shaping institutions and norms.

However, despite these ambitions, Turkey falls short of becoming a credible middle power. This failure is due to a combination of internal structural weaknesses and external geopolitical constraints.

Any state seeking to shape a fair and secure global order, as per Fidan’s vision, must itself be democratic and a consistent upholder of international law. Turkey is not.

Its military invasion and continued illegal occupation of 36.2% of Cyprus undermines its credibility. This action, in direct defiance of multiple UN resolutions, starkly contradicts the peaceful image it projects.

In addition, Turkey cannot credibly present itself as a mediator in the resolution of international conflicts when it has played the role of instigator or direct participant in numerous regional crises—in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. In these cases, rather than facilitating peace, Turkey has either fueled tensions or directly intervened militarily, thereby disqualifying itself from any neutral or stabilising role in such contexts.

In this light, Turkey’s ambitions to act as a facilitator or manager of regional peace are deeply compromised, given that it is not only a catalyst of conflict in many instances, but also a party to the very disputes it purports to resolve.

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Turkey’s entanglement in regional conflicts renders it vulnerable and hampers its middle power aspirations. Should tensions escalate further—especially in Syria or in a hypothetical confrontation with Israel—its strategic ambitions would be severely undermined.

Moreover, while Turkey possesses considerable elements of national power, these are by no means unlimited. The country maintains strong armed forces, yet it lacks the capability to project military power on a global scale. Turkey’s defence industry has indeed recorded notable achievements in recent years; however, it remains exposed and dependent on the political will of major powers—such as the United States and Germany—particularly in regard to access to critical components and materials necessary for the production of its defence systems.

In parallel, Turkey’s economic capacity is insufficient to sustain the grand geopolitical aspirations promoted by President Erdoğan. Coupled with pronounced socio-economic inequalities and the array of domestic challenges the country faces, these factors further weaken Turkey’s resilience and standing in the international system.

Lastly, Turkey cannot be considered a reliable middle power because it is persistently subjected to pressures from global powers such as the United States, Russia, Iran, and China. It often attempts to balance their competing agendas—frequently with limited success. While Turkey may have mastered the art of the oriental bazaar-style diplomacy, major powers are generally unwilling to tolerate such transactional behavior when their core strategic interests are at stake.

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In continuation of the above, it is also essential to highlight several of Turkey’s diplomatic setbacks, which further demonstrate that it does not constitute a reliable middle power nor exercises the geopolitical influence it seeks to project. Specifically:

1. Turkey’s diplomatic initiative to host a summit between the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships in Constantinople, aiming to broker a ceasefire in the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, cannot be considered a success. Rather, it ended in a diplomatic fiasco. A genuine success would have been the participation of Presidents Putin and Trump—and a jointly agreed resolution to end the war. Such an outcome never materialised.
2. Moreover, Turkey has repeatedly declared that it “will not allow its isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean.” This assertion in itself reveals that Ankara perceives itself as isolated—primarily due to strained relations with several of its neighbors (Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel). It is excluded from major regional initiatives such as the EastMed Gas Forum, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and is largely absent from broader European energy strategies. Its response to these developments has often been erratic and confrontational—ranging from challenging the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus, to conducting provocative seismic surveys in contested areas with vessels like the Oruc Reis. Such conduct runs contrary to the stabilising role expected of a genuine middle power.
3. Additionally, the repeatedly critical resolutions of the European Parliament against Turkey, along with the effective suspension of its EU accession process, serve as further evidence of Ankara’s marginalisation from European diplomatic dynamics. These developments reinforce the assessment that Turkey is not a credible middle power with genuine geopolitical influence in the region.
4. Although Turkey was invited—after a 13-year absence—to participate in the Arab League Summit on the situation in Gaza, it continues to struggle in its attempts to normalise relations with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Despite gestures of rapprochement, Ankara has yet to fully reconcile its conflicting geopolitical agendas with these key regional actors.
5. Turkey’s rejection by the BRICS group in 2024, despite its evident eagerness to become a full member, is another clear indication of its failure to achieve its declared objective of strengthening global influence and building durable ties beyond its traditional Western alliances. The denial underscores a broader international skepticism toward Turkey’s strategic alignment and consistency.
6. Furthermore, the decision by Turkic states such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to endorse UN resolutions that label the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) as illegal—and their subsequent moves to deepen bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus by opening embassies in Nicosia—runs counter to the narrative of Turkey as a commanding middle power with significant regional sway. While Ankara has indeed strengthened its strategic relationship with Azerbaijan, it has not succeeded in dominating the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). These developments reveal that its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus is more limited than it claims.

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Regarding Turkey’s potential involvement in European defence—a highly sensitive issue that concerns the entirety of Europe and is expected to be debated in the near future—it must be stressed that despite Turkey’s persistent efforts over the past four years, as well as pressure exerted through friendly governments (such as Germany), this objective has not yet been achieved, and it remains uncertain whether it will be, and under what conditions.

This has not materialized due to the firm stance taken by Greece and several of its allies, who remain highly skeptical of such a prospect. Indeed, French President Emmanuel Macron has openly opposed Turkish participation, diverging from the position of his German counterpart. Macron advocates for a strictly European defence policy, emphasising that resources earmarked for defence should not be spent on armaments from third countries. He further maintains that European defence funding should serve the strengthening of domestic production and the reduction of the EU’s dependency on external suppliers.

Even if Turkey’s participation in European defence were ultimately approved, such a development would not constitute a victory for Turkey—it would rather signal a strategic defeat for Europe.

It would be a defeat because it would clearly underscore the EU’s lack of a coherent and unified strategic vision for its defence and security in a time of major geopolitical transformations. It would also reveal Europe’s inability to independently develop its defence industry, instead turning to external actors for support—an approach that undermines both its autonomy and credibility.

Moreover, although negotiations are still ongoing, the fact that final decisions may be taken by qualified majority voting rather than unanimity marks an unprecedented departure from standard European practice. It also signals a deterioration of the EU’s normative and institutional framework, raising questions about its democratic and consensual foundations.

Should this development come to pass, it would expose a dangerous lack of strategic foresight on the part of European leaders, who would effectively be opening the door to Turkey—a country that increasingly acts as a Trojan horse for Russian interests within the Western security architecture.

In conclusion, despite certain opportunistic gains achieved through the projection of military power and an assertive, high-profile diplomacy, Turkey does not qualify as a reliable middle power and lacks the geopolitical clout it claims through its propaganda apparatus.

Its geopolitical role is increasingly contested by key regional players—such as Israel, France, and India—and remains largely contingent on external circumstances and the shifting balance of power among the major actors of the international system.

Ultimately, it is imperative that those who comment on matters of foreign policy, defence, and security adopt a more measured and informed perspective. They must refrain from uncritically echoing Turkish propaganda and perpetuating a carefully packaged myth of Turkey’s so-called “geopolitical upgrade.”

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*Political Scientist – International Affairs Specialist, Former General Director – General Directorate of National Defence Policy and International Relations (GDPEADS) of the Ministry of National Defence (HMoND) 

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