Dr. Konstantinos P. Mpalomenos*

Although the defence, security, and protection of the territorial integrity and independence of the member states of the European Union (EU) remain primarily national responsibilities, the issue of European Defence and Security has recently moved to the forefront of discussions among EU leaders..

The reasons for this development include:

• The destabilisation of the European security order caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine;

• The recent strategic decision by the United States to downgrade its participation in the defence alliance that has safeguarded peace in Europe for nearly eight decades;
• And the realisation by European leaders that the EU’s economic power alone is insufficient to meet the external security challenges facing the continent, as well as the current geopolitical developments in the international system. 

In this context, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders launched significant initiatives to shape a common European Defence and Security strategy [Strategic Compass], published the European Industrial Strategy (EDIS), Strategic Agenda 2024-2029,  and culminated with the release of the Defence White Paper and the decision to implement a European Rearmament Plan (ReArm Europe), with a proposed budget of €800 billion.

Notably, Greece played a decisive role in all these initiatives, with many of its national positions being vindicated.

Specifically, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has emphasised the importance of EU “Strategic Autonomy”, aiming for the Union to become a credible security provider. He has advocated for the EU’s ability to take autonomous political decisions while simultaneously possessing the necessary means for implementation, developing capabilities independently, and resisting any kind of threat.

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Mr Mitsotakis was among the first European leaders to highlight that strategic autonomy cannot be achieved without reinforcing European defence and the European defence industry. In this vein, in May 2024, he and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk sent a letter to Ursula von der Leyen, proposing the creation of a common European air defence “SHIELD”, funded by the EU. He was also among the 19 EU leaders who signed a letter to the European Investment Bank, calling for increased funding for European defence.

At the European Council Summit in Brussels on 19 December 2024, Mr Mitsotakis stated that EU countries must assume responsibility for organising their own defence. Given the severe geopolitical tensions, he called for a political awakening in Europe, proposing the allocation of EU resources and the establishment of a European Defence Fund.

At the same meeting, following a proposal by the Greek Prime Minister, it was agreed to convene an Extraordinary Session of the European Council on 3  February 2025, devoted exclusively to European Defence.

Just hours before this extraordinary Summit, Mr Mitsotakis played a leading role by rallying the European People’s Party—of which New Democracy is a member—to support the Commission’s proposals for increasing EU defence spending

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He also entered the Summit advocating for the creation of a new European fund—similar to the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility—of €100 billion to finance common defence spending and to exempt military expenditures from the EU’s strict fiscal rules.

Despite criticism from certain domestic quarters, the European Defence White Paper fully endorses the Greek positions.

Specifically:

• A common European fund of €150 billion is being established for joint defence procurement, accessible only to EU member states or countries with strategic partnership agreements with the Union. 
• The National Escape Clause (NEC), which was requested by the Greek Prime Minister, allows fiscal flexibility, enabling member states to increase defence spending to 1.5% of GDP over four years.
• The idea of ​​a European Defence Union is being promoted, focusing on coordination and cooperation exclusively at EU level. 
• Turkish participation in European defence is explicitly ruled out.  

These developments not only bolster the European defence industry but also significantly strengthen the Greek defence sector and enhance Greece’s geopolitical role within the European security architecture.

In recognition of this, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently selected Greece as one of the two sites (alongside Germany) for the EU’s secure satellite communications programme, GOVSATCOM. 

Also, the fact that according to the said programme, Greece will serve as a hub for managing and providing secure satellite communications to critical infrastructure across all EU member states—without the possibility of interference by third countries or external threats. This selection is a strong vote of confidence in Greece’s strategic importance.  

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Despite these significant achievements, it is important to note that these decisions, although aimed at strengthening the European defence industry, do not sufficiently advance the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU.

Therefore, the reasonable question arises whether European leaders really have a strategy for formulating a realistic one CSDP where it will be able to deal with Europe’s security threats, in order to protect its citizens and strengthen international peace and security. However, from the movements so far, it can be seen that there is still a long way to go to achieve such a goal. 

In support of this view, it is worth pointing out some elements for which there is no provision in the Defense White Paper which has just been issued. 

Specifically, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, referred to a more active Europe in the field of security, incorporating the Petersberg type military tasks. The Petersberg tasks concern the mobilization of conventional military forces to carry out the following missions:

• Humanitarian and evacuation missions;

• Conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations;

• Combat force crisis management, such as peace enforcement;

• Joint disarmament operations;

• Military advisory and assistance missions;

• Post-conflict stabilisation operations.

On 22 May 2023, the Council also approved a new civilian CSDP Compact, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, impact, and flexibility of civilian missions within the CSDP framework.

Today, given that European leaders (Macron, Tusk, etc.) and EU officials (Kaja Kallas, Ursula von der Leyen, among others) openly discuss the possibility of war between Europe and Russia, it is clear that the current CSDP is inadequate for this new security environment. It remains focused on crisis management, not on active war engagement.

Furthermore, there exists an institutional and operational gap regarding EU member states’ involvement in potential warfare. 

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According to the January 2020 report by the EU’s Directorate-General for Foreign Policy, which evaluated the success of EU missions and operations, three chronic problems were identified:

1. Divergent attitudes among member states regarding the use of force;
2. Disincentives and obstacles to early European solidarity;
3. A gap between early warning and early action.

These issues reflect the broader structural problem in the EU’s CSDP—namely, differing strategic perceptions among member states about what constitutes a security threat and what role the EU should play in defence.

For example, Greece sees Turkey as its primary threat, while the UK and Baltic states focus on Russia. Similarly, Greece views illegal immigration as a security threat, whereas countries like Belgium and the Netherlands see it as a challenge.

This divergence leads to inconsistent approaches to key security matters based on national interests or bilateral relations, ultimately undermining unity and solidarity.    

In fact, the new Defence White Paper defines Russia as the sole primary threat to Europe, ignoring possible threats from the South—such as migration, terrorism, border security, and maritime security. 

Moreover, while the new Defence White Paper reaffirms that the EU will always act in a way that respects the unique security and defence policies of certain Member States and takes into account the collective interests of all its members, it notably omits any reference to the mutual assistance clause (Art. 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, TEU). This leads to a fundamental and urgent question: What will happen if an EU Member State suffers a sudden attack from a third country? Will the mutual assistance clause be activated—or not?

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This omission is of key importance for the CSDP, because based on this clause, in the event of an armed attack against the territorial integrity of a Member State, the other Member States of the EU must assist the state attacked, according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Also, while the same text refers to the European contribution to the prevention and collective defence of NATO, nothing specific is mentioned about how the –NATO strategic partnership will be strengthened, so that the EU may act in a complementary manner to NATO and avoid any overlaps.

Finally, in the new White Paper on EU Defence, there is no reference to the potential improvement of the EU’s operational capabilities or the implementation of the older idea for the creation of a Euro Army (at the European Council of Helsinki in 1999, the Member States had agreed to be ready to assemble, within 60 days, and to maintain for at least one year, military units with a total strength of 50,000 to 60,000 personnel).

Specifically, in the text of the EU Global Strategy presented in June 2016, for the first time the protection of Europe and its inhabitants from any kind of threat was presented as a strategic priority of the EU.

But how is it possible that the defence of the territorial integrity of Europe is primarily a competence of NATO? Therefore, in order to ensure the strategic autonomy of the EU and its Member States, and for them to be able to deter any kind of threat through capacity building and action, some form of Euro Army is required.

In conclusion, given that the redesign of the CSDP is currently high on the agenda of European leaders, Greece, as a country that actively participates and makes a decisive contribution to achieving substantial strategic autonomy of the EU–so that Europe becomes a reliable international security provider–has a unique opportunity.

In continuation of the national successes achieved so far in relation to this issue, Greece is invited to take initiatives and bring the above issues to the negotiating table both within EU institutions and on a bilateral level, in order to make a decisive contribution to the new CSDP under development and, at the same time, to further safeguard the national interests and security of our homeland.

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*Political Scientist – International Affairs Specialist, Former General Director – General Directorate of National Defence Policy and International Relations (GDPEADS) of the Ministry of National Defence (HMoND) 

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