Dr Konstantinos P. Balomenos*

Recent events across Europe indicate that Russia seeks to expand its influence not only through displays of military power and the weaponisation of energy, but also through propaganda, disinformation, and hybrid threats that act as multipliers of its geopolitical strength.

This strategy is not an isolated choice but rather a consistent modus operandi that Russia employs to advance its national objectives.

In particular, Russia carries out hybrid operations targeting the cognitive domain — the perceptions of leaders and officials of state or non-state international actors it seeks to influence. Through propaganda, ideological pressure, disinformation and narrative management, Moscow exploits the vulnerabilities of its targets, delegitimises democracies and their values, destabilises governments and societies, divides citizens and leaderships, and ultimately seeks to influence decision-making processes.

A characteristic example of this strategy is the use of drones and other unmanned systems in hybrid activities against European states, aimed at surveillance, infrastructure disruption and the creation of psychological pressure, combined with information campaigns.

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The same approach — albeit with different tools — is applied in the peace process regarding Ukraine. Moscow attempts to shape the international narrative, portraying itself as a “responsible negotiator” and the West as the main culprit for the conflict.

It also uses influence networks and disinformation mechanisms to create conditions favourable to its own positions and to shift blame for prolonged instability onto others. Moreover, Russia deploys strategic deception within the framework of broader information operations, projecting an image of power — partly fabricated — to present itself as a “victorious power” capable of imposing its terms in peace negotiations.

By projecting an image of “inevitable victory,” Russia aims both to strengthen its internal cohesion and to shape negotiating conditions advantageous to its goals. This strategy acts as a “trap” for the West, as it seeks to cultivate doubt, sow disunity, and provoke concessions that would grant Moscow political and geo-economic benefits reinforcing its strategic position internationally — regardless of the actual situation on the battlefield.

Simultaneously, Russia uses intimidation as a negotiation tool, embedding it in a wider framework of information and psychological operations. Through a combination of military and political posturing, threats, disinformation and the creation of a sense of unpredictability, it seeks to constrain opponents’ options and manipulate their perceptions — ultimately imposing its will and securing favourable terms that enhance its strategic, geopolitical and geo-economic gains.

Within this context, Greece — owing to its critical geostrategic location and its dual membership in NATO and the EU — cannot remain outside the scope of Russia’s influence strategy in the wider region. Specifically, through a systematic and targeted hybrid warfare campaign exploiting Greece’s vulnerabilities, Russia conducts information and psychological operations that cultivate anti-Western narratives and amplify extremist or marginal voices undermining the country’s national interests.

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A recent example is the attack by Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova against Greece, using old and new propaganda narratives to undermine the country’s international credibility. Zakharova accused Greece of violating the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, claiming that the Colonels’ Junta “intervened in Cyprus in an attempt at annexation by Athens” and that Greece “blocked international cooperation initiatives with the Republic of Macedonia” until 2018.

This move is not accidental but part of a broader information warfare strategy designed to revive historical tensions and create false associations with genuine social and national sensitivities. Through this attack, Zakharova seeks to cast doubt on Greece’s international standing — a country that has consistently acted based on international law, respect for sovereignty, and commitment to peace and cooperation — and to destabilise it by undermining national unity and social cohesion.

Within this framework, sensitive national issues such as Greek-Turkish relations, migration, energy dependence on Russia and religious (Orthodox) identity are exploited to weaken Greece’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, create internal fractures, delegitimise political leadership and shape conditions favourable to Russian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

To achieve these goals, networks of “analysts,” “journalists” and “institutes” reproduce narratives portraying Russia as a “natural and trustworthy ally” due to religious and historical ties, while promoting the illusion that distancing from the West would better serve Greece’s national interests.

In reality, these are instruments of a hybrid campaign aimed not only at undermining Greek foreign policy but also at creating a society vulnerable to foreign narratives — one that is divided and ready to question the country’s fundamental security choices.

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Tangible examples of this strategy include the aggressive rhetoric of President Putin and senior Russian officials against Greece and its Prime Minister. This rhetoric is reflected directly in the Russian press, notably in Pravda articles depicting Greece as a “country of negligible power,” over-indebted and led by an “out-of-touch” leadership.

The targeting of the Greek Prime Minister intensified following his visit to Odesa for the 2025 Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit, where Russian analyst Lyubov Stepushova described him as “irrational” and Greece as “up to its ears in debt”, openly questioning its capacity to participate in reconstruction and connectivity projects in the region.

The same analyst accused Athens of “megalomania” and “excessive ambitions” beyond its real capabilities, projecting a narrative of weakness and inadequacy that serves Russia’s strategy of delegitimising Greek foreign policy.

In this context, Russia’s official decision to classify Greece — along with Cyprus — among the countries with “destructive behaviours” allegedly opposing “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” represents not only a tool of communicative and ideological pressure but also clear evidence that Moscow now perceives Greece as a “hostile country”, with all the implications this has for regional security and stability.

Moreover, Moscow seeks to separate Greek society from its political leadership by systematically promoting the narrative that it “punishes” governments but still “respects” peoples. This strategy, accompanying the designation of Greece as a “hostile country”, aims to create an artificial rift between state and society, cultivating pro-Russian sentiment and undermining Greece’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Through selective references to “traditional bonds” and “common Orthodox values”, Russian propaganda attempts to instil the idea that the West is alien and hostile to Greek interests, while Russia is Greece’s “natural ally”.

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In reality, this is a mechanism of psychological and informational influence exploiting social sensitivities, economic inequalities and national issues to erode citizens’ trust in institutions and make Greek society more susceptible to Russian hybrid strategies.

Within this state–society divide, Russia reinforces its efforts through a demonisation strategy targeting Greece’s political leadership. By portraying Greece and its Prime Minister as weak, incompetent, or overestimated, and turning them into “enemies” in the eyes of domestic and international audiences, Moscow seeks to delegitimise both the country and its leadership.

Through this tactic, it aims to sow division, cultivate doubt, and erode trust in institutions, while presenting itself as a “moral superior” and “natural ally”, thus serving its geopolitical and strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Consequently, segments of the Greek political spectrum, as well as certain analysts and commentators, have sought to depict Russia as a “victim” of the West and the war in Ukraine as an inevitable reaction to “NATO encirclement.”

According to proponents of this narrative, Russia is merely protecting its historic territories and vital interests; the invasion of Ukraine was not an invasion but a “special military operation”; Ukraine has already been defeated; Europe is weak; and Greece is “undermining its own defence” by supporting Ukraine.

At the same time, the Greek government and the Prime Minister are portrayed as “mere extras”, while Greece, according to this logic, should align openly with Russia and limit its cooperation with the West. However, such arguments lack seriousness and do not promote national interests.

The invasion of Ukraine is a blatant violation of the sovereignty of an independent state and of international law, while allegations of “genocide” of Russian-speakers are unsubstantiated by international organisations. Similarly, appeals to “shared Orthodox values” are propagandistic myths and standard tools of psychological manipulation. In practice, Moscow has not hesitated to form a strategic alliance with Erdoğan’s Turkey, which directly threatens Greece.

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If Russia were truly Greece’s “natural ally”, it would not have financially supported Turkey to prevent its bankruptcy, continually armed it or financed the construction of its nuclear power plant — an existential threat to Greece. Nor would it tolerate Turkey’s persistent aggression in the Aegean and the violation of Cyprus’s EEZ.

As I have noted in a previous article, Greece’s position regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the only possible course — not because it was aimed specifically against Russia, but because Greece’s principles would apply to any aggressor.

Greece operates internationally based on principles, values and respect for international law — this has been the compass of Greek diplomacy since the founding of the modern state. From the outset of the Russian invasion, Greece condemned it, as it violates international law, undermines European security and endangers continental and global stability.

Having long experience of threats to its borders and facing Turkey’s expansionist and revisionist policy, Greece promptly denounced Russia’s aggression against Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity — acts that have cost thousands of innocent lives.

In response to Ukraine’s request, and in coordination with NATO and EU allies, Greece demonstrated solidarity by providing significant humanitarian aid — medical supplies, materials and non-essential military equipment that was neither operationally necessary nor detrimental to Greece’s own defence. It did not send tanks, F-16s or air-defence systems; the limited military materiel delivered was obsolete and costly to dismantle.

It must be clearly understood that if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine succeeds and the use of force to alter borders is normalised, the “law of the jungle” will prevail — where any state that believes itself strong enough could invade another to impose its will.

In such a world, Greece would likely face an attack from revisionist Turkey, which seeks to alter the legal status of the Aegean and revive the Ottoman Empire.

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If Greece were to side with Russia, endorsing a violation of international law and legitimising territorial conquest by force, how could it then condemn a future Turkish invasion or seek support from the international community? Such a stance would expose Greece internationally, as one cannot denounce Turkey’s illegal invasion of Cyprus and simultaneously support another aggressor.

Greek foreign policy is not conducted “à la carte.” It is characterised by consistency — upholding international legality and opposing any act of aggression, regardless of the perpetrator.

Within this framework, Greece’s objective is a just and sustainable peace, an immediate ceasefire, strong security guarantees for Ukraine and active participation in its reconstruction.

To those who argue that Greece applies “double standards” by supporting Israel while condemning Russia, it must be emphasised that this comparison is flawed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and sovereignty, whereas Israel’s actions, though controversial, fall within a different legal context of counterterrorism operations.

Greece’s relationship with Israel is primarily a matter of defence cooperation and does not negate its steadfast support for a two-state solution and Palestinian rights. Therefore, Greece’s stance on Ukraine is not selective but rooted in principles that apply universally.

In conclusion, facing this multifaceted threat, Greece must not remain passive but strengthen its resilience at every level against external influence.

The response cannot be limited to government statements or denials — it requires a comprehensive national security strategy combining public awareness, critical thinking against disinformation and rapid-reaction mechanisms to counter information attacks.

Shielding society, reinforcing state strategic communication and deepening cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners are essential pillars for deterring Russian influence.

Greece must adopt a holistic approach that integrates institutional vigilance, civic education and collective strategic awareness — ensuring its steady orientation within NATO and the EU, protecting its sovereign rights and preserving social cohesion against manipulation.

Ultimately, strengthening resilience against disinformation is not only a matter of security but also one of institutional and national responsibility.

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*Political Scientist – International Affairs Specialist, Former General Director – General Directorate of National Defence Policy and International Relations (GDPEADS) of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence (HMoND) 

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*** Original text in Greek. Translated in English for DEFENCE ReDEFiNED