*Dr. Konstantinos P. Balomenos

On 27 May 2025, the General Affairs Council of the European Union (EU), despite opposition from Greece and Cyprus, decided by qualified majority — rather than unanimity (thus precluding any veto) — to allow Turkey’s indirect participation in European armament programmes.

Despite manoeuvrings by certain EU partners who sought Turkey’s involvement in the SAFE programme, and an unprecedented institutional deviation from standard EU procedures, the pressure exerted by Greece and Cyprus secured significant safeguards, including:

1. a) Article 16, which explicitly states that “the participation of a third country in the SAFE programme may be excluded if it poses a direct threat to the security of an EU Member State”; and
2. b) the inclusion of Article 212 in conjunction with Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which relate to the EU’s external action and stipulate that economic, financial, and technical agreements with candidate partners must be decided unanimously.

These developments sparked intense debate in Greece, with some media representatives and well-known populists – the proverbial “armchair patriots” – branding the outcome a national failure or defeat. But in reality, is Turkey’s partial involvement in European defence a national failure, or rather, a national opportunity?

From this perspective, it is important to note that the issue of Turkey’s involvement in European defence is not new.

Also read: The obscure files of an anniversary or David vs Goliath: The Serbian Air Force against the 1999 NATO ‘Allied Force’ Operation

For decades, Turkey has participated – directly or indirectly – in European defence. Its longstanding strategic objective has been full integration into the relevant structures and participation in European defence programmes. For instance, in 1992 Turkey became an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU), albeit without voting rights. At that time, the WEU was the primary European defence body prior to its integration into the EU through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

In the 2000s, Turkey, as a NATO member, demanded institutionalised access to EU decision-making and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Notably, in 2003, the EU and NATO concluded the “Berlin Plus” agreement, allowing the EU to use NATO’s planning assets and capabilities for its operations. Turkey, by virtue of its NATO membership, held veto power over such use – and exercised this veto repeatedly, particularly in missions involving Cyprus.

Within this framework, Turkey also participated in EU missions, such as “Operation Concordia” in North Macedonia (2003) and “Operation Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004). Moreover, in 2006, Turkey signed an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency (EDA, founded in 2004 to support EU Member States in enhancing military capabilities). Under this arrangement, Turkey was allowed to monitor cooperative programmes, participate in selected research initiatives, and contribute to working groups on technical and scientific matters.

Also read: OPINION | TIME OF DECISION FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Additionally, while not an EU Member State, Turkey actively participated in EU research programmes – primarily through Horizon 2020, the EU’s research and innovation funding programme for 2014–2020. Notably, Turkey:

• Participated via TÜBİTAK BİLGEM in the RESIST project (Resilient Smart Critical Infrastructure Systems), focused on protecting critical infrastructure against cyber and natural threats.
• Took part through Arçelik A.S. in the iBUS project (Integrated Business Model for Customer-Driven Custom Product Supply Chains), dealing with digital technologies in manufacturing.
• Collaborated in the development of Industry 4.0 tools within the European Factory Platform (EFPF), alongside partners from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.

It is also worth highlighting that, despite occasional restrictions or exclusion from EU programmes (such as PESCO, the EU SatCom Market, EDF programmes, and IRIS² satellite programme), Turkey continues bilateral cooperation with EU defence industries.

For example:

• ASELSAN (Turkish defence company) collaborates with French companies Airbus Defence and Space and Thales LAS on studies and technical services for NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), particularly in the development of modular and scalable ground-based air defence systems.

• Roketsan, Turkey’s missile manufacturer, partners with Thales (France) and Leonardo (Italy) on subsystem exports and joint research in new technologies, while maintaining ties with Spanish and Polish companies in propulsion systems.

Given these facts, we must ask those who criticised the recent EU decision and labelled national defeat: were they unaware that Turkey has long been involved—directly or indirectly—in European defence?

If they were unaware, how can they credibly express opinions on foreign and defence policy matters? And if they were aware but chose silence for political or personal reasons, does this not make them not only populists, but also potentially dangerous?

Also read: OPINION | The Geopolitical Value of Maritime Spatial Planning

Moreover, how can one claim a national failure when Turkey itself is not celebrating the decision, but protesting the restrictions imposed on its participation? If Greece had truly suffered a defeat, why is President Erdoğan—along with Turkish media—attempting to decouple the lifting of the casus belli (raised by Prime Minister Mitsotakis) from Turkey’s participation in European defence?

To further debunk these claims, we must remember that it has long been Greece’s official position—supported by the majority of political parties and successive prime ministers—to endorse Turkey’s EU accession path, as a means of promoting peace, stability, and the normalisation of bilateral relations. If Turkey were eventually to join the EU as a full member, would it not then participate in European defence on equal terms?

Would today’s critics then call that a national success? Is there, perhaps, a lack of seriousness and an excess of hypocrisy in the Greek public debate?

Taking the above into account, the author believes that Turkey’s participation in European defence is not a national failure for Greece—but a collective failure of the EU.

This moment should be seized as a strategic opportunity for Greece to craft a compelling narrative and initiate diplomatic efforts to convince its partners that Turkey’s participation represents a strategic setback for Europe and a dangerous experiment that threatens the coherence and sustainability of the EU project.

To achieve this, Greece should:

• Politically leverage the institutional irregularity of the qualified majority vote (bypassing the veto mechanism) to highlight the EU’s democratic deficit. Decisions bypassing the European Parliament raise serious concerns about legitimacy and set a troubling precedent for transparency and accountability.

• Advocate that it become an EU strategic priority to prevent Turkey’s full integration into European defence, for the following reasons:
• Turkey weaponises defence policy for national expansion, not collective security. While EU states seek to defend against the Russian threat, Turkey remains a key Russian ally and Trojan horse within both NATO and the EU—having refused to impose sanctions, maintained defence ties with Moscow, and acquired Russian military equipment.

• Turkey pursues regional hegemony through coercive diplomacy and faits accomplis in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. Advanced military technology acquired via the EU could be used against Member States.

• Turkey systematically violates the EU’s institutional and value framework. According to the European Commission and European Parliament, Turkey is undemocratic, disregards the rule of law, and violates human rights—disqualifying it from meaningful integration into the EU defence ecosystem.

Also read: A reluctant alliance? A different approach to French – Serbian defence relations

Moreover, for the sake of Greece’s credibility within the EU defence architecture, it is strategically important to decouple Turkey’s involvement from the Greco-Turkish conflict. In this era of geopolitical transformation, Greece must not appear to block collective EU efforts on account of bilateral disputes.

At the same time, acknowledging the reality of Turkey’s longstanding involvement (which is rarely admitted publicly), the author argues that Turkey’s participation need not be seen as a national failure, but rather as a national opportunity.

This involvement could be more beneficial to Greece if Turkey is embedded in a European framework governed by rules, procedures, and accountability, rather than operating unpredictably and unilaterally. When participating in EU missions or structures, Turkey is subject to collective oversight—making its behaviour more constrained and predictable.

It is therefore preferable to confront Turkey within an EU framework—where Greece holds influence, allies, and procedural leverage—than outside it. Moreover, Turkey’s engagement with the EU defence system is, by definition, a recognition of the EU’s geopolitical role—a development Greece must exploit.

Turkey aspires to be a regional hegemon in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. That ambition is incompatible with EU collective defence. Ankara must choose: remain an autonomous actor, or operate within a collective European framework. If it chooses the latter, doctrines like “Blue Homeland” and its revisionist rhetoric will undermine its credibility—opening diplomatic space for Greece.

Greece can (and partially already does) use Turkey’s interest in European defence to:

• Raise awareness about its own security concerns,

• Forge new alliances,

• Present Greek national issues as European priorities.

The safeguards imposed on Turkey’s limited participation—and Ankara’s reaction to them—confirm this potential.

These safeguards allow Greece to shape the terms of Turkish involvement, linking them to progress on key issues (e.g. lifting the casus belli, resolving the Cyprus dispute, respecting maritime zones, and ending airspace violations).

In conclusion, Greece has no reason to fear Turkey’s limited involvement in European defence. On the contrary, it can use this moment strategically—to contain Turkish aggression and compel Ankara to comply with the EU’s institutional rules and values.

Also read: Opinion | Understanding the Adversary

*Political Scientist – International Affairs Specialist, Former General Director – General Directorate of National Defence Policy and International Relations (GDPEADS) of the Ministry of National Defence (HMoND) 

**The views and/or comments expressed in the articles belong to each author and may not constitute an opinion and/or position and/or be adopted as is by the company and/or the site administrators. More in terms of the use of the website.