Anastasios Rozolis*

My presence at the international Defence and Security exhibition FEINDEF in Madrid was not just another business mission. It was a cause for reflection. Observing up close the organised, coordinated and strategically oriented presence of countries like Turkey, I couldn’t help but wonder: why can they – and we can’t?

The international Defence and Security exhibition FEINDEF in Madrid highlighted, in the most tangible way, the institutional deficiency that continues to characterise the Greek approach to the Defence Industry sector.

40 consecutive years of state support and assistance: Turkey systematically invests in its domestic defence industry through the Presidential Secretariat for Defence Industry (SSB), building autonomy and strength

Among the impressive state presences, that of Turkey stood out. Not only because of the size of the mission, but mainly because of the state entity that framed it: the Turkish Presidency’s Defence Industry Secretariat (SSB) and the importance of this event.

A structure established as early as 1985, which currently manages over 750 programmes and acts as a lever for strengthening production, extroversion, co-productions and investments, with the main focus on the technological and industrial dominance of the country.

The example of Turkey is far-reaching. However, the example of the Republic of Cyprus is even more revealing.

 Snapshot from the first meeting of the newly established Defence Industry Council chaired by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Nikos Christodoulides

Despite the fact that the Cypriot defence industry is in its infancy, the Cypriot government recently proceeded with the establishment of a Defence Industry Council, with the task of formulating proposals to the President of the Republic for the strengthening of the national defence technological base, the development of synergies with universities and research centres and the alignment of domestic industrial production with the needs of the National Guard.

The other state of Hellenism, a country smaller in size and capabilities than Greece, shows political boldness and institutional foresight – where Greece insists on silence.

Greece, by contrast, remains without an institutional shelter for its Defence Industry. No unified planning, no long-term policy, no coordinated support or implementation mechanism. The participation of Greek companies in the armament programmes continues to be piecemeal, opportunistic, and without guarantees of continuity.

And yet, the potential is there. The Greek defence ecosystem now consists of approximately 260 companies. One-third of these are exclusively active in the field of defence, with increasing specialisation in areas of the Fourth Industrial Revolution such as drones, cyber systems, and AI applications. It is an ecosystem that mainly produces the software of the weapon systems, not their hardware – and therefore requires investment in the connection with universities, research centers and R&D policies, which are currently systematically absent – ​​with the bright exception of the establishment of DefencEduNet, the country’s first defence cluster.

At the same time, while Greece’s equipment planning after 2020 exceeds 11.5 billion. euros, the participation of domestic companies in the production and support of the new weapons systems remains limited. The lesson from the 1990s is bitter: massive armament programs with zero repercussions for the country’s industrial base, as the infamous offsets turned out to be one of the biggest scandals in armaments history.

 Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) signed on May 14, 2025 an agreement with the European giant Airbus and about 15 Spanish defence companies to jointly produce the Hurjet trainer and attack aircraft for the Spanish military.

The problem is not a lack of talent or knowledge. The country had and still has competent scientists, specialised technical personnel and businesses with know-how. What it did not have and still does not have is a stable state structure – to draft policy, coordinate actions, attract investments and participate international co-production schemes.

That is why the SEKPY emphatically reiterates its standing proposal: the establishment of a Deputy Ministry or Secretariat of Defence Industry, with clear competence, horizontal interconnection with the Staffs and co-competent ministries, a distinct role in international negotiations and a long-term institutional mission. A body that will formulate policy and not run to adapt to the circumstances.

The Turkish ballistic missile threat is met in Greece with complacency, instead of domestically developing a strong missile counterweight with deterrent and operational value

National Defence cannot rely on purchases alone. It needs production, technological self-sufficiency, and an industry that is a strategic partner and not a mere observer. It is time for the State to rise to the occasion and adopt an institutional architecture comparable to international practices and our national ambitions.

Why is it that other countries, with fewer resources or a smaller industrial footprint, have already built institutions and policies to develop their defence ecosystem, while Greece remains institutionally uncovered and strategically uncoordinated?

The absence of structures is not a technical issue – it is a matter of political choice.

Also read: SEKPY Convened Strategic Closed-Door Meeting During DEFEA 2025 to Strengthen European Defence Industrial Cooperation

*President of SEKPY 

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