Dr Konstantinos P. Balomenos*

As is well known, the scheduled meeting between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and President Erdoğan in New York did not take place.

Although this development should not necessarily be considered of major importance in itself, the way it was presented by both sides highlighted the dynamics of the blame game in interstate and international relations more broadly. Each side rushed to offer its own version of events, seeking to shift responsibility for the cancellation onto the other.

In such cases, the essence lies not only in what happened but, above all, in how it is managed and how it is communicated. In diplomacy, when things do not proceed as planned, the first concern is not an explanation but the assignment of responsibility and the management of impressions. This directly influences how domestic and international audiences will interpret the event.

Within this context, it becomes clear that, in diplomacy, the battle of impressions often proves as critical as the facts themselves. The blame game in international crises can be defined as the strategic process by which state and non-state actors attribute responsibility for events or failures in order to gain political, diplomatic, or communicative advantage. It functions as a strategic tool to legitimise decisions, deflect internal accountability, and maintain or expand international influence.

At the same time, it shapes perceptions regarding the moral responsibility and political credibility of the actors involved. Through the blame game, crisis management becomes inseparable from image and communication; depending on its use, it can either undermine or enhance international cooperation.

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In short, the blame game as a diplomatic practice does not aim at uncovering the truth but rather at persuading audiences—domestic and international—so as to advance each side’s strategic objectives. In this case, the Greek side presented the cancellation of the Mitsotakis–Erdoğan meeting as a consequence of Turkey’s stance.

According to the official narrative, the cancellation was due to “technical reasons” and “scheduling issues” that prevented the necessary conditions for the meeting, compounded by other critical engagements, as Foreign Minister Gerapetritis stressed. 

Government sources further emphasised that Athens remains firmly committed to dialogue and that Greece was not responsible for the cancellation; instead, it was Turkey that backtracked and failed to honour prior agreements. This narrative aligns with Greece’s established strategy of portraying itself as the “responsible actor” seeking dialogue, in contrast to Ankara’s inflexibility and diplomatic manoeuvering.

Thus, the blame game was employed both to reinforce Greece’s international image and to manage domestic perceptions, bolstering the government’s legitimacy by showing it defended national interests consistently without being at fault for diplomatic setbacks or conceding ground that could weaken the country’s position.

Moreover, government sources warned that if Ankara cited its inability to hold the meeting, this would appear as a mere pretext—a statement clearly aimed at pre-empting Turkey’s counter-narrative and framing it as strategic evasion.

Athens also interpreted Ankara’s handling of the issue as reflecting President Erdoğan’s irritation over recent Greek initiatives such as maritime spatial planning, the creation of marine parks, and Chevron’s declared interest in energy exploration within Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone. 

By spotlighting these issues, the Greek side tied the cancellation to Turkey’s habitual objections over sovereignty matters, reinforcing the argument that Ankara used the blame game as a pretext to carry its geopolitical grievances into the diplomatic sphere.

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The cancellation, however, also became a flashpoint of domestic political controversy. Opposition parties seized upon it to attack the government, using terms such as “sloppiness”, “amateurism”, “incompetence”, “diplomatic failure”, “humiliation”, “international embarrassment”, and “marginalisation of Greece”. In doing so, they shifted the debate from the strategic dimension of foreign policy to the communicative aspects of the event, transferring the blame game from the international stage into domestic politics. 

This entrenched sterile confrontation and populism, diverting attention from substantive national priorities. By contrast, when Erdoğan also cancelled his planned meeting with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, the Italian opposition refrained from similar criticism. This comparison highlights the Greek political system’s pathology of weaponising foreign policy issues for partisan gain, thereby undermining national cohesion and credibility abroad.

From Ankara’s perspective, the initial explanation was that Erdoğan’s “packed schedule”, including an urgent meeting of Arab and Muslim leaders convened by Donald Trump at the same time as the planned bilateral, made the Greek meeting impossible. In this way, Turkey used the blame game to frame the cancellation as an unavoidable consequence of external factors, while maintaining the image of a responsible and methodical leadership.

Subsequently, Turkish officials accused Athens of prematurely publicizing the meeting before a joint agreement had been reached (“the Greek leak”), thereby attempting to shift responsibility and suggest that Greece had violated trust and diplomatic norms. 

Through the pro-government newspaper Milliyet, Turkey went further, criticising Greece for what it termed a “recurring Greek illness”—seeing constant threats from Turkey—and downplayed the importance of Greek-Turkish relations compared with Turkey’s broader international priorities (e.g. Syria’s territorial integrity, Israeli expansionism, and regional conflicts).

Domestically, the Turkish leadership avoided any self-criticism, instead reinforcing an image of strong and decisive governance capable of managing multiple international agendas simultaneously. Notably, unlike in Greece, the Turkish opposition did not criticise Erdoğan or exploit the issue for political gain.

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In conclusion, Turkey sought to shift focus away from its own possible political responsibilities and portray the cancellation as the inevitable result of objective circumstances, while simultaneously attributing blame to Greece. This allowed it to protect both its international image and President Erdoğan’s prestige, reinforcing the perception of Turkey as a powerful and reliable actor on the global stage.

Overall, the cancellation of the Mitsotakis–Erdoğan meeting revealed deeper weaknesses of the Greek political system:

• lack of national cohesion,
• the instrumentalisation of foreign policy issues for partisan advantage, undermining unity and credibility abroad,
• the dominance of tactical communication over strategic policy, often involving propaganda, disinformation, and manipulation of public opinion,
• the tendency to import the blame game into domestic politics, turning foreign policy into a field of sterile confrontation.

The purpose of highlighting these flaws is not to disparage the political system but to underscore the need for a culture of self-criticism and institutional maturity. Only through such maturity can Greece strengthen its national strategy and international credibility.

This calls for initiatives to enhance national resilience through a coherent strategic communications approach embedded in overall national strategy—one that will allow Greece to avoid the pitfalls of the blame game, safeguard its credibility, and protect its international image. Such an approach requires:

• understanding the communicative environment,
• managing information effectively during national crises,
• avoiding exaggeration and limiting the partisan exploitation of sensitive issues.

If Greece succeeds in controlling its narrative, it will be able to:

• shape how all stakeholders—domestic, foreign, and the media—interpret a crisis,
• guide the framing of critical developments,
• mitigate negative perceptions and hostile reactions,
• present its decisions as rational, fair, and aligned with strategic national interests, thereby enhancing both domestic and international legitimacy.

Ultimately, the real issue is not the cancellation of one meeting but Greece’s ability to control its narrative, transcend the traps of the blame game, and implement a strategic communication policy that reinforces credibility and image abroad. On the global stage, what endures is not merely the truth of events but the perception we succeed in shaping—through calm, institutional, and nationally responsible strategic communication.

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*Political Scientist – International Affairs Specialist, Former General Director – General Directorate of National Defence Policy and International Relations (GDPEADS) of the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence (HMoND) 

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*** Original text in Greek. Translated in English for DEFENCE ReDEFiNED